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CPLR 602."'s The court further stated that the factors involved
which relate to a change of venue under CPLR 510 are relevant
in the exercise of the court's discretion under CPLR 602. 3 4 Therefore, while the-same factors may be inherent in a motion under
CPLR 510 and CPLR 602, in the former these factors are controlling, whereas in the latter they are not.
ARTICLE 10- PARTiES GENERALLY

CPLR 1007:

Third party action based on subrogation where no
payment luhs been made allowed.

CPLR 1007 provides in part that "a defendant may proceed
against a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. .. ."
In Krause v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,35 plaintiff,
trustee in bankruptcy for one of the victims of the great "salad
oil swindle," sought recovery on broker's bonds issued by the
defendant insurance company. The insurance company sought to
implead the American Express Company and the issue was raised
as to whether CPLR 1007 permits a third-party action based on
subrogation where no payment has been made. The appellate
division held that impleader was permissible under the statute
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In its opinion the Court of Appeals distinguished Ross v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co.36 and apparently limited it to automobile
collision cases. In Ross, the plaintiff-insured's contract with the
defendant-insurer provided that the defendant's right to subrogation
would not mature until payments were made under the policy. In
Krause there was no such policy term. However, Ross also
rested on the broader ground that impleader under CPLR 1007
should not be permitted to an insurer whose claim is based upon
rights to be gained by subrogation. This concept is based on the
reasoning37 of the dissent in Madison Ave. Props. Corp. v. Royal
Ins. Co. which required that "[t]he third party plaintiff must
have, at least, some color of a present cause of action." 38
The Court rejected this rationale finding it inappropriate to
the realities of the commercial type of litigation presented in
Krause. But, the Ross precedent was left undisturbed to govern
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Id. 287 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
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the automobile collision situation, where other policy considerations
control.
The Court stated, inter alia, that the insurer should not "be
required to make an election between its defense to the main
action and its subrogation rights." 39 Furthermore, other features
of the CPLR, such as severances, stays or separate trials, would
provide an adequate remedy for the insured-should its rights
be prejudiced in any way.40
While the instant case clearly indicates that the Ross rule
vill be undisturbed in the automobile collision situation, it seems
apparent that impleader will now be available in virtually all
subrogation situations. CPLR 1007 will still remain, however,
the ward of judicial discretion.41
CPLR 1007.: Court refuses to allow cause of action for implied
indemnity where no common basis of liability exists.
In

Fladerer v.

Needleman,42 the appellate

division,

third

department, held that a vendor had no cause of action for implied
indemnity against her attorney "not merely because of the failure
to demonstrate an active-passive negligence situation but because
...the contract vendor and her former lawyer occupy no common
basis of liability to the contract vendee." 43
Vendor brought suit against her contract vendee for repudiation
of their contract and the vendee counterclaimed on the ground
that the vendor's title was unmarketable. Consequently the vendor
impleaded her attorney whom she alleged was primarily liable
for any damages on vendee's counterclaim. The attorney interposed the statute of limitations to bar the third party action,
but the lower court rejected this defense since an action for
indemnity "accrues not at the time of the commission of the tort...
but at the time of the payment of the judgment. . . ." 44
The appellate division sustained this conclusion, but refused to
allow the vendor's cause of action for implied indemnity, because
the counterclaim rested on contract and the third party complaint
rested on negligence. Moreover, there was a failure to demonstrate
an active-passive negligence situation. One suspects that the court's
somewhat restrictive view of implied indemnity was prompted by
a desire to protect the lawyer from possibly becoming, in its words,
an insurer of title.
39 22 N.Y.2d at 156, 239 N.F.2d at 180, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
Id. at 153, 239 N.E.2d at 178, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
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41See genzerally 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 1007, supp. commentary 56-60
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43 Id. at 375, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
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